Tag banks

Taler, Taler, du musst wandern

Von Ingo Malcher, von brandeins wirtschaftsmagazin


Geldwäsche ist ein internationales Gewerbe – und es ist nicht immer leicht zu unterscheiden: Was ist ein legales Geschäft und was nicht? Denn die Beteiligten machen sich dabei zunutze, was auch der legalen Wirtschaft dient: die Globalisierung.




Myths and Realities: How to Launder Money in the 21st Century

Money laundering is a massive global problem. It allows criminals to infuse trillions of dollars of black money into the stream of commerce and business, corrupting financial institutions and officials and at the end the complete economy. It can be stated that, at the beginning of the 21st century, not the banks are the number one targets of the laundries, but in addition to conquest of cyber space their “activities” spread more and more to the global world of general business life, where dozens of companies which are deemed to be unblemished, having seemingly honest business operations can always be found.

Those wanting launder money, always going one step forward in front of the authorities, through the most different money laundering techniques, more and more overlie the still unexploited legal economic opportunities – causing some trillion dollar damages to the world economy – and resulting from it the difference between legal and illegal economy gets smaller and smaller and presumably will be terminated with the time. Today, the laundries make often use of many forms of parallel banking systems. This is facilitated by the globalisation of economy, new internet techniques of virtual currencies and the inability of the authority to combat transnational constructs. In essence, it is inspired by the Knights Templar banking system of about 1000 years ago, with their currencies, transaction systems and fortresses.

The battle is continuous, but as it’s known, the mine of technical achievements and of human ingenuity seems to be everlasting, thus who knows what the future will bring. There are so many money laundering systems existing that it’s difficult to note all of them, but all of them have common features and practically they mean only the endless variations of the same theme: deception of identities and camouflage of money transactions.

Classical techniques of money laundering

In countries where the banking system is underdeveloped yet, the simplest solution is when the criminals take over the control of the given financial institution and realize through it their dirty transactions.

One of the oldest usual method of money laundering, of presentation as legal of illegal money is the purchase of art treasures and jewellery easy to transfer and of stable value. The laundry presents the art treasures and jewellery in question – or rather the money obtained for them – as if they were the estate not found earlier of a deceased relative of him. To avoid denunciation, it’s expedient to sell by public auction the purchased valuable movables and to keep the received coverage certificate. In case of professional laundries it may also happen that they buy themselves the art treasures and jewellery at the auction, and later they sell them again. By so doing the valuables remain and the certificates are also obtained. Although the costs of auction are lost, but a further advantage is that it’s even more difficult clear up the origin of money and the valuables can be sold at a higher price.

The technique of illegal money import is excellent for the initial making disappear of the traces, when the smuggler himself, eventually by making use of a messenger or by international transport brings physically the dirty money to a foreign country where the regulation of money market is less developed and/or the legislation prefers the banking secret. Thereafter, as a result of different financial transactions, the money is mixed with the money of legal origin. Disadvantage of this method is that cash is heavy, therefore is difficult to hide, and has the risk to be stolen or the smuggler gets caught at the customs examination.

One of the simplest methods is the technique of smurfing or nominal partnership. A team of couriers (smurf, nominal partner) places small amount deposits every day in always other financial institutions. All deposits are below the amount which would call the attention of the banks (value below report limit). When the money is drawn later on, the origin can be certified with the documents belonging to it.

To further avoiding of reporting financial transactions, respectively to obliterate the traces indicating them, the split or divided into parts money laundering method is applied. A high amount transaction is divided into many smaller amount transactions.

Many money laundering activities are connected to the gambling too. The laundries legalize their income through casinos in most of the cases. They buy tokens for cash in high amount with the aim to play, but they use only a small part of the tokens or they don’t use them not at all. Then they redeem them and ask for certificate about the “prize”. In case an authority is asking for the origin of the amount, the answer is that it’s originating from gambling. A more perfect method is when the laundries have their own casino. In this case the only to do is to record the dirty money as income of the casino

A primitive but functioning method is to agree with the casino owner in a less developed country about the certificate of a higher amount prize.

In addition to the casinos, the gambling prize can origin from lottery, horse-race or even greyhound racing, as well as from activities outside of betting agencies. In this circle the most traditional method is the buying of the wining ticket. In such a case the lucky winner gets even more money than the prize, from the laundry who obtains this way a fully “legal” income. The main point of the fraud related to horse, respectively greyhound racings is that the race is hustled then the bet is made with “dirty” money for all possible outcomes of the result.

One of the most ingenious solutions is probably the technique of overpayment on tax account. As a result of “incidental procedure error”, the private person or the company effects an overpayment of considerable amount to the competent tax office. Then after observation of the error – following filling in of a self-control form – the overpayment is retransferred by the tax office to the bank account of the “erring” tax payer, and the origin of money is already certified.

The point of self-financing loan (Dutch sandwich) is that the “client” places the dirty money in a foreign country or in a financial haven. After that he transfers the money to a bank in an other country, and then applies for a loan at his own bank, the guaranty, collateral being the deposited money. The bank grants the loan, which will be invested into properties, companies respectively into different financial instruments. In case of any suspicion arisen (e.g. sudden richness) the person concerned can refer without fear to the bank loan. This technique can exploit the different countries’ regulations concerning banking secret.

The point of the technique related to real estate is when the laundry takes mortgage for the real estate from and off-shore company being in his ownership, or rents real estate from an off-shore company, of which he is anonymous owner.

One of the members of the organisation buys for cash high value article (e.g. car or period piece) and sells within short time, but in the way that the buyer pays already with transfer to one or more legal bank accounts indicated by the seller.

Buying of gift vouchers as simple all-day buyer, several times, in several places, in average, usual denomination and amount. Thanks to the increasingly spreading franchise systems, these vouchers can be spent at more and more points of the world, or can be simply legally owned, kept.

Assuring real estate credit for an investor, who for some reason could get credit only with difficulties (e.g. the investment is too risky or bizarre, or simply because the investor has no durable contacts established yet with the financial institutions). Let’s presume that the loan amount would be EUR 70 million. At this point these “companies” organise a EUR 100 million credit, to be paid back in say 5 year time. The borrower is obliged to buy investment trust unit for EUR 30 million. This is immediately conveyed to the real estate company (to the loaner). About the 70 million a bank is providing security for a letter of credit in amount equal to full interest paid for 70 million, using the investment (real estate) as for pledge. Of course, to avoid risk, this is also conveyed to the real estate company. Result: the investor obtains the necessary amount (70 million), the real estate company gets investment trust unit in the value of EUR 30 million, guaranteed interest payment for the loan, and credit balance certificate if the borrower could not perform his payment obligation. In 5 years time white clean money will be available at zero risk.

Establishing fictitious business organisation – which can’t be found at its residence, the manager and members are presumably homeless or persons engaged for money – transfers arrive to its account, and these amounts are collected in cash buy a person who is not member, not officer of the company, or the money is transferred through a subcontractor network among each other with fictitious contracts, as long as the money becomes clean.

Fictitious transactions. Here not the object of purchase is fictitious, but its price is not covering the real market value. Let’s suppose we have EUR 100 million. Let’s buy for example a real estate for EUR 25 million and let’s look for a “buyer” for it who will buy it from us for 75 million with the passing of a certain time. This is of course not a genuine buyer, only such a “blameless” person who could really have that much money without any problem. At the sale and purchase not his 75 million will be received but the our one which we gave him in cash. The payment is effected already with bank transfer, so the amount arrives in a “legal” clean form to our account. It’s true that the earlier invested 25 million, the duty and tax to be paid and the fee of “assistance” paid to our “buyer” are to be booked as “loss”, but even so, more than the half of our money became white (in addition the state got its part too from this with the paid in duty and tax). This method can work also in the way that a higher amount of down payment is “paid” for the real estate to be purchased, but the sale and purchase fails for some reason, so the amount of down payment is lost, or we get back its double (it makes no difference as the person of seller and buyer is the same).

Creating a cover company, dealing with trade of antiques, among others. It’s buying up continuously antiques for cash, which are of average value, popular and relatively many of them passes through many hands. When the stock is available the company offers these for sale, divided among different auction houses country- and worldwide. If one of the lots comes under the hammer the person in question lets to sell it to the person offering the most, or sends in secret one of his people to the auction to buy it back. Independent from the buyer, beside the certificate the purchase price reduced by commission from all lots gets legally to the bank account (in case of own purchase even the article offered for sale is also remaining which can be sold again). The commission can be booked as cost of money laundering.

One of the most perfect ways of perpetration is when the dirty money is mixed with legal money. It’s “worth” pumping money into enterprises which are cash intensive branches, i.e. it’s normal to have high physical cash flow (e.g. restaurants, casinos, currency exchanges). When the type of enterprise is accepted, i.e. cash forms the higher portion of their income and so of their banking transactions, the dirty cash can be incorporated without any problem into the system. It’s very difficult to follow this type of transactions and to prove how many portions of dishes have really been served per occasion. As long as the dirty money is gradually fed into the system, the matter remains undoubtedly unseen. The criminals can apply this technique in case of already existing enterprises or can establish their own one. Indeed they can establish a totally fictitious company too, which has absolutely no activities except invoicing, i.e. is a laundry.

We acquire or establish two companies. One where money was acquired, the other where the money is to be placed. The company, to where the money is to be sent, orders certain goods or services. The trick is: either the invoices containing the products or services are overvalued (the surplus corresponds to the amount to be cleaned) or false invoices are sent. The first method is much more difficult to be disclosed. The paid amount can be deducted by the company which one settled the false or overvalued invoice.

The underworld organisation acquires – possibly fully or partly in cash – an uncared-for restaurant or any kind of service unit in line with its “scope”. The renovation, paid mostly also in cash, artificially increases the unit’s value. At this point they could get out from the business and could sell the newly started business (even with profit too) as the money becomes legal in their bank account after being transferred. But this can be further increased. The appliances, materials needed to start the business and the continuous daily wasting assets are purchased from a company belonging to the interest of the organisation. At each daily order, the delivered quantity is 20 – 30 percent less than effectively ordered on the documents (e.g.: in case of a restaurant only 40 kg meat instead of 50 kg). The organisation pumps dirty money into the enterprise to replace the shortage. The same happens in case of the other wasting assets too.

The money flown through the different bank accounts of the covering companies established in several countries, more and more legal “layers” are placed, making more difficult to identify the real origin of dirty money. Finally, the off-shore covering ventures invest the money into real estates and wait until they will be suitable to be sold. Completed hotels and apartment houses stand empty for years, waiting for the owners’ dirty money to get clean through termination.

The property acquired from crime is inserted in a legally established company, there it’s recorded as revenue. Both the revenue and expenditure booking data are forged, i.e. the “cleaned” money is covered with fictitious invoices.

Technique of over- or undercharge. Products or services are purchased at artificially high price (in this case the “profit” remains at the seller) or at artificially low price (in this case the “profit” remains at the buyer) from the money passed through several transactions.

Method of acquisition and selling of companies. From the layered money, the laundries acquire, including assets, a low value company having very little own property. Then the assets are revaluated, the company is sold and “legal” profit is realised.

Insertion of phony companies. The laundries acquire control of a company of which true owners’ identity is hidden for the authorities. Trading, financial transaction, forging of balance sheet loss/ profit, borrowings and exploitation of tax benefits are performed under the mask of this covering company.

Acquisition of sports club, respectively player. The buying and selling for several million dollars of professional sportsmen (mainly football players, ice-hockey players), called also slaves of modern age, among the different sports clubs offers excellent opportunities to legalise dirty money. These so called “showcase” companies are ventures which in classical meaning are not connected to the criminal groups, but practically are under inspection and control of the underworld.

By increasing of layering the origin of money becomes untraceable through crossing and covering operations, purchases, electronic transfers, frequent transfers, such as:

– Repeated buying and selling of bearer securities

– Repeated buying and selling of registered securities with involvement of owner

– Electronic there and back transfers among the same accounts

– Buying and selling of traveller’s cheques, air-tickets, banker’s drafts

– Commodity exchange contracts

These transactions are easier to perform when the laundries are infiltrated to the brokerage institutions, or the employees of those are corrupted, blackmailed.

Merchandise laundering: In addition to the techniques of money laundering it’s also worth to mention the merchandise laundering, being a process similar to money laundering. In this case the merchandise is cleaned, that is it’s sold and purchased out of the banking system, adding the most possible masking “layers” as long as the merchandise respectively money becomes fully clean.

The use of gold purchase for criminal purposes is one of the most effective mechanisms to clean illegal money. Its outstanding role is due to the fact that it can be used in many different ways, can be changed in several ways, and can materialize, respectively. promote all separate phases of money laundering. Whether in form of bar, fragments or jewellery, this precious metal is easy to buy, can be got through geographical borders and can be resold, i.e. money can be relatively easily legalised.

The barter trade system of commercial products such as agricultural commodities, other non-ferrous metals and precious stones offers also opportunities the revenues to be “legalised” this way, especially when all this is made in the legal export-import guise between different countries.

The dirty revenues from drugs laundered in the African barter trade are also to mention here, getting greater and greater role in the money laundering transactions of the world.

Secret banking systems

The more and more strict regulation of banking system leads to that the laundries are forced to find new possible channels outside of the banking system. As stronger the regulation the more demand for new alternatives. It has to be promptly noted that this change is highly touching the legal operating companies of business life too as from now on these are the potential targets for money laundering. The targeted companies are menaced, exploited or their control is overtaken simply by force. Any kind of products can be interesting for the criminals which can be purchased for cash in adequate volume and then can be easily sold.

The laundries also make often use of many forms of the parallel or underground banking systems. These non official, secret banking systems were developed by criminal groups mainly due to political chaos and distrust in banks. The organised (family, tribal) contact is typical for their operation. The purpose during their use is to avoid the financial regulations in force in the different countries in order to bring out the dirty and/or clean money from the country, respectively to settle the goods purchased abroad (capital flight). The system can only work properly when the countries concerned have commercial contacts which each other and the operations can be balanced with the time.

The simplest form was invented by the Chinese under the name fei chien i.e. flying money. The process works as follows: e.g. the dirty money is deposited in a gold shop in Hong Kong – for which the owner gets an overstamped dollar note or a small piece of paper or card marked with an innocent looking secret sign. Later on this is presented at a moneychanger in the Chinatown of an American city and the owner gets his cash which can be further covered through new transactions.

The essence of Hawalah network is the laundry to place money at a hawalah-banker somewhere in the world, which can be drawn few hours later -after deduction of commission – in an other part of the world (a very good sample is the case of India and the United Kingdom, where it’s the interest of the significant Indian population living in Great Britain to bring money grom the subcontinent to Europe). The system works as the market is two-directional. That is, there are persons in both countries who have large amounts of cash surplus (organised criminals) and who are ready to pay in a big way for the possibility to make use of a paper free banking system.

New money laundering possibilities offered by the digital money system and by the development of Internet

By development of the techniques at the beginning of the 21st century the laundries have nearly everything available to enter the “space” and by conquering newer and newer dimensions they continue undisturbed their dirty activities.

While the authorities still concentrate on the problem of “terrestrial” money laundering – first of all of off-shore financial centres -, the criminals are one step forward and they move and clean their money in the cyber space, i.e. online, with no little success.

To the greatest pleasure of the laundries, the “face to face”, respectively “know your client” principle gets more and more injured by the expansion of online. It is not in the power of the banks, economic units to know who is standing exactly behind the transaction (phone, computer). Who has the disposal of user name and the password belonging to it, can open bank account online; can order international business enterprises; can participate in different share trading models; can communicate via nameless e-mail; can diffuse money through online casinos and betting offices; can buy houses via Internet; can penetrate money through online auctions; can open his own off-shore or online bank, i.e. can do nearly everything.

The spreading of prepaid credit cards in the US and Russia also offers opportunity for anonymity. These can easily be bought without knowing the buyer’s identity. Moreover, certain criminal groups are just sending the filled cards per regular terrestrial mail and nobody can notice it.

It’s possible to play in the virtual casinos sites and online sport bet sites from any point of the world. Most of them operate as off-shore company of course. There are 2’900 legally registered sites and additional 20’000 sites without any gambling license. The organised crime is standing in the background in many cases. The money laundering trick is as follows. In order to play for “prize”, first a credit line is to be registered at the casino. Exploiting the lack of regulation, the most simple is to send average amount of cash. Some gambling is played and the rest of credit line is claimed in form of cheque or transfer. This method is however not very efficient since it implies transactions limits. More sophisticated methods in the contest of online gaming is to use the fact that online gaming licenses are only issued in countries known as off-shores heavens. Even legally operated online sites can be used as pretext to dissimulate a high volume of fictitious transactions between cover companies.

The possibility of opening online bank account and the banking and electronic payment systems operated through this terminate more and more the need of personal contact. Making use of the free and anonymous services offered by e-mail have access via the Internet to the letters and bank accounts of their own and of others (e.g. in Internet café or in public library). Thus they can create an e-mail possibility which will be then used only from public terminals, that means it’s nearly impossible to follow that kind of communication access and utilization. To cover their transactions, they use online channels, deemed to be legal, suitable for money transfer, as e.g. Liberty Reserve or E-Gold or Gold & Silver Reserve or … Let’s imagine that one of these groups can create false identities. Then he can open with them as much accounts as he wants, has access to them anytime and from anywhere in the world, i.e. can easily launder money through them. You can try yourself and create a false identitiy in Liberty Reserve: just register with a fake name and address – It works! Liberty Reserve SA is registered in Costa Rica. Notice that Costa Rica is also the pioneer country in online gambling.

There are many virtual currencies available: MoneyMail, LiqPay, UkrMoney, moneta.ru, Z-Payment, NN-Money, AlertPay, DeltaKey, LibertyReserve, Perfect Money, AlterGold, Pecunix, V-Money, Webcreds, W1 RUR, Edram, E-Gold, C-Gold, iMoney, E-bullion, InoCard, Chebo Money, ECUmoney, Express Gold, ICQMoney, IntellectMoney, VRS, Wirex, Dengi 2.0, Younicrata. You can transfer virtual currencies to any Exchanger having a business relation with the issuer of the virtual currency. Some of the Exchangers can pay out in cash or make transactions into a correspondence bank or through Western Union without limits. As example you can find a list of the Exchanger working with Liberty Reserve here http://www.libertyreserve.com/en/exchangers. Just try it – It works!

With the use of virtual money the bank regulation can be evaded and the criminals can launder illegal money. The registered users can perpetrate different transactions evading the SWIFT control for the money “issued” by the company. Some companies accept this virtual money for means of payment too, i.e. changes into official currency, thus it becomes available everywhere in the world and can be transferred to everywhere.

Geldwäsche: Immer neue Tricks

Korrupte Politiker, fintenreiche Finanzkriminelle: Die Jagd auf Geldwäscher ist anspruchsvoller denn je. Die internationalen Ermittler machen jetzt Druck auf die Banken – und auf die Schweiz.

Es sah aus wie ein ganz gewöhnliches Geschäftsessen. Die beiden Herren nahmen ihren Lunch im «Dolder Grand» in Zürich zu sich, und niemand hätte geahnt, dass es um ganz grosse Geschäfte ging – um Geldwäscherei. Ebenso wenig wäre Beobachtern der Szene im ­Januar 2004 in den Sinn gekommen, dass sich dort ein Politiker mit einem Tat­verdächtigen besprach: der serbische ­Innenminister Dusan Mihajlovic mit Stanko Subotic, dem mutmasslichen Drahtzieher einer Zigarettenschmuggler-Organisation.

Nach Ansicht des steinreichen Geschäftsmannes Subotic ist nicht er der Bösewicht, sondern Minister Mihajlovic. Subotic lebt heute in Genf, von dort aus orchestriert er seine Geschäfte. Legale ­Geschäfte, wie er sagt. In seinen Augen ist der Minister Teil einer kriminellen ­Organisation, die ihr Geld mit Erpressung mache. Er hat gegen Mihajlovic in Genf eine Strafanzeige eingereicht.

Die Geldwäschereibekämpfung ist kompliziert geworden, Gut und Böse sind nicht mehr einfach zu identifizieren. Während das Thema Geldwäsche in der Öffentlichkeit kaum noch grosse Erregung hervorruft, versinken die Ermittler in Fallakten über virtuelle oder reale Gangster-Netzwerke, Dossiers mit Tausenden verdächtigen Transaktionen, mit Klagen und Gegenklagen. Die Täter sind dabei den Fahndern wieder einmal eine Nasenlänge voraus – mit neuen Maschen und undurchdringlichen Strukturen. Und die Schweizer Behörden machen dabei – wieder einmal – keine gute Figur.

Er selbst sei unschuldig, sagt Stanko ­Subotic. Nach dem Lunch habe er im «Dolder» noch sieben Stunden mit dem Polizeiminister zusammengesessen. Mihajlovic habe ihm mit einem mysteriösen Grinsen ein neues Ermittler-Organigramm vorgelegt, auf dem wieder einmal sein Name zu finden war, aber auch «die wirklichen Zigarettenschmuggler, die mit dem Staat zusammenarbeiten». Darunter auch Marko Milosevic, der Sohn des ehemaligen serbischen Präsidenten. Subotics Version: Die herrschende politische Klasse will ihn mit Strafuntersuchungen erpressen, ihm sein Geschäft entreissen und es selbst weiterführen. Mit einer aufwendigen PR-Kampagne verbreitet er diese, seine Wahrheit.

Günther Hermann kann sich noch gut an Subotic erinnern. Ein Jahrzehnt lang hat der Zollfahnder aus dem deutschen Lindau die Zigi-Schmuggler-Mafia gejagt. Und immer wieder geisterte der Name Subotic durch die Akten – als Drahtzieher von Geldwäsche-Operationen. Was haben seine Ermittlungen gebracht? «Nichts, gar nichts», sagt Hermann heute, drei Jahre nach seiner Pensionierung, «es waren zehn Jahre sinnloser Arbeit.» Dass der Fall eine Nummer zu gross war, verstand Hermann nach einem Gespräch mit einem schwerkranken, inzwischen verstorbenen Schweizer Treuhänder. «Sie werden nie Erfolg haben», erklärte ihm der Mann, «das ist viel zu politisch.» Das Geschäft war von Oligarchen orchestriert worden, Ermittler Hermann konnte nur scheitern.

Rüge für die Schweiz. Seit 13 Jahren registriert die Schweizer Meldestelle MROS bei der Bundespolizei die Verdachtsmeldungen. In der Schweiz war das Thema in den Pionierjahren von einem hohen öffentlichen Interesse begleitet. Dann kam der Ermüdungseffekt. Heute ist das Regelsystem keineswegs in bester Verfassung, es agiert oftmals nur noch als mechanisches Meldesystem, ohne analytische Kompetenz und kriminalistisches Gespür. Mal wird gemeldet, mal nicht, und Gemeldetes bleibt oft ­folgenlos. Das Abwehrsystem erscheint schon jetzt zahnlos und steht bereits vor einer neuen Herausforderung: Künftig sollen, so wollen es die führenden Nationen, auch schwere Steuerkriminelle mit den Mitteln der Geldwäschereibekämpfung erfasst und verfolgt werden. Es ist kaum auszudenken, wie die Compliance Manager in den Schweizer Banken mit dieser Regelverschärfung umgehen wollen.

Mehrfach wurde die Schweiz in der Egmont-Gruppe, der Weltorganisation der Anti-Geldwäscher-Behörden, gerügt. Im Januar drohte ihr sogar der Rausschmiss aus der Organisation, weil sie ­innerhalb des Verbundes die einzige Meldestelle ist, die keine Finanzinformationen an ihre Partnerbehörden weitergibt. An der jüngsten Konferenz der Gruppe wurde sie nochmals verwarnt, ihr System in Ordnung zu bringen. So drängt auch Bundesanwalt Michael Lauber, die Sache nicht schleifen zu lassen: «Informationen über verdächtige Finanzflüsse sollten stärker als heute analysiert und ausgewertet werden können.» Er will ein Kompetenzzentrum einrichten.

Dem Schweizer Meldesystem fehlt vor allem die Kompetenz in Informationsbeschaffung, Recherche und Analyse. Das demonstriert zum Beispiel der russische Fall rund um den Hedge Fund Hermitage Capital Management, der auch die Credit Suisse belastet. Hermitage wurde vom ­libanesisch-brasilianischen Bankier Edmond Safra gegründet. Nachdem Safra im Dezember 1999 einem Brandanschlag in seinem Penthouse in Monte Carlo zum Opfer gefallen war, führte der Brite Bill Browder die Geschäfte weiter. Das Rezept: Investments in korrupte, unterbewertete Unternehmen tätigen und mit Hilfe von Untersuchungsbehörden und Medien Druck auf das Management aufbauen, um den Unternehmenswert zu steigern. Russland wurde zur Goldgrube für Hermitage. Bis CEO Browder 2006 «als Gefahr für die ­nationale Sicherheit» geächtet wurde, Moskau eine Strafuntersuchung wegen Steuerbetrugs und Geldwäsche begann und Browders Anwalt Sergei Magnitsky im November 2009 in einem Moskauer Gefängnis ums Leben kam.

Im Januar 2011 konterte Hermitage. Anwälte des Hedge Fund sandten der Bundesanwaltschaft eine Strafanzeige mit dem Vorwurf, die Ex-Chefin des zuständigen Moskauer Steueramtes habe mit Komplizen Firmenbeteiligungen von Hermitage im Wert von 230 Millionen Dollar gestohlen. Die Belege dazu: Credit-Suisse-Papiere zu Geldverschie­bungen und Immobilieninvestments in Dubai mit dem Namen der Steuerbeamtin. Russische Ermittler wiederum hegen den Verdacht, dass Hermitage-Leute das Vermögen verschwinden liessen. Wie auch immer, die Firmen jedenfalls sind neu registriert worden – in der autonomen Republik Tatarstan.

Fingierte Identitäten. Die Credit Suisse dementiert jegliches Fehlverhalten: «Wir sind überzeugt, dass unser Kontrollsystem wirksam ist.» Hermitage-Chef Browder erreichte schliesslich ein US-Gesetz, das russischen Beamten, die mit dem Fall betraut waren, die Einreise in die USA verweigert. Die Bundesanwaltschaft analysiert derzeit die Geldflüsse.

Noch komplizierter gestaltet sich ein Fall, der seine Wurzeln in den baltischen Staaten hat. Das Problem der Ermittler: Sie können keine Täter identifizieren. ­Zunächst entdeckten sie, dass in verschiedenen Transaktionen dieselben Kontoinhaber auftauchten – Briefkastenfirmen von London über Zypern bis ­Neuseeland. Dann versuchten sie den Mann ausfindig zu machen, der vielfach bei den Firmen als Direktor fungierte: Erik Vanagels. Sie fanden mehr als 300 Vanagels-Firmen, aber den Mann fanden sie nie. Nur so viel wissen sie: Vanagels ist ein Obdachloser, niemand von seinen Angehörigen weiss, ob er noch lebt.

Die Ermittler kamen einem virtuellen System von Briefkastenfirmen auf die Spur, die ihre Deals zumeist über Riga in Lettland abwickelten. Die Namen von Firmendirektoren waren gestohlen – ein Identitätsdiebstahl mit Pässen, die ahnungslose und mittellose Menschen ausgeliehen hatten. Das Vanagels-System wurde im Geldwäschermilieu zur Verfügung gestellt. «Das ist ein Full Service Provider», erklärt der Zürcher Experte Andrea Galli vom Ermittlungsunternehmen Scalaris, «das System funktioniert wie ein Geldwäsche-Supermarkt.» Benötigt wird im Prinzip nur eine Fälscherwerkstatt, die – auf Bestellung – ­liefert. Über das Vanagels-System wurden so unterschiedliche Deals abgewickelt wie Anlagebetrügereien in den USA, Immobilientricks in Moldau, Drogengeld­wäsche für mexikanische Kartelle, ­Waffenschmuggel nach Südsudan, Piraten-Websites in der Ukraine und der überteuerte Handel mit Impfstoffen gegen das Schweine-Virus, den man der früheren ukrainischen Premierministerin Julija Timoschenko vorwirft. In der Summe waren es rund zehn Milliarden Dollar, die gewaschen wurden. Die Ermittlungen laufen noch.

Das Versagen der Banken. Die Untersuchungsbehörden schenken den Bankhäusern nicht mehr so viel Vertrauen wie zu Beginn des Aufbaus der internen Kontrollsysteme. Sie haben gelernt, dass riesige Compliance-Abteilungen noch kein Garant dafür sind, dass sie auch funktionieren. So musste die Finma irritiert registrieren, dass die Geldhäuser immer noch Potentatengelder zuhauf bunkerten, obwohl die Schweizer Regeln als besonders scharf galten. So bestrafte die britische Finanzaufsicht im März die Coutts Bank, eine noble Tochter der Royal Bank of Scotland, wegen lascher Geldwäsche-Kontrollen. Zwielichtige Kunden aus den arabischen Aufruhrstaaten hatten über Coutts-Konten ihre Gelder ausser Landes gebracht. «Die Verfehlungen waren inakzeptabel», erklärte Tracey McDermott von der Financial Services Authority. Und durch eine Undercover-Operation deckten US-Drogenfahnder Ende 2011 auf, wie die Terrororganisation Hisbollah im ­grossen Stil Drogengelder über die Lebanese Canadian Bank gewaschen hat.

Die USA wollen die lasche Haltung der Banken nicht länger dulden. Am 17. Juli beschuldigte der US-Senat die britische Grossbank HSBC, jahrelang gewaltige Summen an Drogengeldern mexikanischer Kartelle gewaschen zu haben. Undercover-Agenten hatten den Untersuchungsausschuss auf die Spur gebracht. HSBC-Manager entschuldigten sich umgehend für ihr Versagen. Sie warten nun auf ihre Strafe. Der Ausschuss betonte: Die HSBC sei nur als Exempel herausgegriffen worden. Es könne auch andere Banken treffen.


Artikel aus bilanz.ch. Von:Leo Müller

Link zum Original

$40trilions: The global debt clock is ticking inversely proportional to the corruption perception

The clock is ticking. Every second, it seems, someone in the world takes on more debt. The idea of a debt clock for an individual nation is familiar to anyone who has been to Times Square in New York, where the American public shortfall is revealed. Our clock shows the global figure for all (or almost all) government debts in dollar terms.



See full screen: http://www.economist.com/content/global_debt_clock

Does it matter? After all, world governments owe the money to their own citizens, not to the Martians. But the rising total is important for two reasons. First, when debt rises faster than economic output (as it has been doing in recent years), higher government debt implies more state interference in the economy and higher taxes in the future. Second, debt must be rolled over at regular intervals. This creates a recurring popularity test for individual governments, rather as reality TV show contestants face a public phone vote every week. Fail that vote, as the Greek government did in early 2010, and the country can be plunged into imminent crisis. So the higher the global government debt total, the greater the risk of fiscal crisis, and the bigger the economic impact such crises will have. (Source: The Economist.)

Comparaison with corruption index

Interesting is to look at the inverse correlation with the corruption perception index

We omit any comments on this paradox. (note of the scalaris redaction)

British banks facing claims risk in $1trillion Saudi fraud case

British banks facing claims risk in Saudi fraud case HSBC and Standard Chartered could be dragged into a multi–billion dollar dispute between warring Saudi factions after the banks were forced to hand over thousands of potentially incriminating documents. A court in New York ordered the two British banks together with Citi and Bank of America to disclose confidential client documents, overruling pleadings that the evidence could be used against them. The documents relate to bank accounts held by Maan Al–Sanea, a Saudi billionaire who is being pursued for billions of dollars he is alleged to have stolen. Mr Al–Sanea is facing criminal and civil proceedings relating to billions of dollars allegedly defrauded from his wife’s family, the Algosaibis. Cases against the accused are being pursued in London, Bahrain, the Cayman Islands and Switzerland. The potential for claims against the four banks that handled more than $1trillion (£624bn) of Algosaibi money was revealed in a court transcript obtained by The Daily Telegraph. The four banks argued that the release of documents to the Algosaibis could be used as a “Trojan Horse” to bring cases against them. However, in the worst possible outcome for the banks, the argument was rejected by the judge who stated their potential liability. “I have never fully seen the force… of the Trojan Horse argument,” said the Honourable Jed Rakoff. “If it [the information] is genuinely relevant abroad, he [Algosaibi] gets it even if it hurts you, for lack of a better word. And if it’s not relevant abroad, he doesn’t get it.” The judge also acknowledged there could be a question mark over whether the banks had taken “reasonable steps to ascertain who their customer was”. As such, he admitted that there could be a “potential liability”. The ruling will be particularly embarrassing for HSBC which is understood to have handled the largest share of the $1trillion under question in the matter. As well as operating accounts for two of Mr Al–Sanea’s companies, the bank’s US arm loaned him millions of dollars and looked after his personal banking. Mr Al–Sanea was also a significant presence on the HSBC share register, at one point owning more than 3pc of the bank. The dispute between Al–Sanea and the Algosaibis is one of the biggest fraud cases ever to hit the courts. It concerns allegations that Mr Al–Sanea took control of the Algosaibis’ business empire AHAB and subsequently siphoned off billions of pounds. The huge losses built up under Mr Al–Sanea’s control led to the near collapse of the AHAB Group after the financial crisis hit in 2008. As well as facing criminal proceedings, Mr Al–Sanea is facing a $10bn claim brought by the Algosaibis. In turn, the family is being pursued for billions of dollars by the banks that lost out when loans failed. All four banks declined to comment. The Telegraph Maan Al–Sanea has $9bn freezing order lifted.

Daily Telegraph (UK)